ABSTRACT. Official international economic statistics are generally considered accurate and meaningful gauges of cross-border flows of trade and capital. Most data users also assume that the quality of the underlying data keeps improving over time.
Introduction 1
Although the global economy is invisible to the naked eye, we discuss, research, and govern it day in, day out. To do so, we rely on macroeconomic statistics numbers about trade, inflation, economic growth, foreign direct investment (FDI), and so on. What we know about the aggregate global economy, we know from spreadsheets that translate abstract concepts into concrete figures.
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Almost half a century ago, Sartori admonished researchers that "concept formation stands prior to quantification". 3 Although comparative political methodologists have generally heeded this advice and examined measurement inaccuracies and potential mismatches between their concepts and actual measures, 4 economic indicators have generally escaped such scrutiny. Produced by government agencies, macroeconomic statistics unlike, say, democracy indices carry the authority of being "official" numbers.
While most researchers realize that economic statistics are less than perfect, 5 users of statistics in policymaking, politics, and academia generally assume that the data are not too bad to begin with, and that they are improving. Herrera and Kapur (2007) . 6 is an exception with his meticulous and critical discussion of FDI data.
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We argue that both assumptions are unwarranted. Analyses of error margins in international economic statistics, interviews with high-level statisticians, and archival records reveal that measurement uncertainty is worryingly large. We also find significant gaps between the concepts we wish to capture with international economic data and what data in official databases actually measure. What we call the conceptmeasurement gap is large and growing.
Statistical indicators derived from a country's national accounts and balance of payments (BOP) depict distinct national economies interacting across clearly identifiable borders. But this neatly inter-national image corresponds less and less to the economic realities of the 21 st century, 7 when amorphous services trade, financial offshoring, and intangible assets cloud measurement and undermine the concept validity of many indicators. And despite capacity building efforts and drives towards international harmonization 8 , measurement accuracy has hardly improved over the past decades. As a result, the measurement quality of BOP statistics is deteriorating and we cannot simply assume that the data suit our purposes. Belying their clear separation in statistics, FDI flows are frequently impossible to distinguish from short-term capital flows; domestic sales can end up registered as cross-border services "trade"; foreign takeovers of domestic firms appear as portfolio capital "outflows"; and so on. Given the stickiness of international statistical standards in the face of accelerating economic change, these problems are only likely to get worse.
Far from a wholesale indictment of international economic statistics, we argue for greater awareness of problems with the data and their responsible use. Our analysis thus chimes with scholarship that has pushed the discipline to engage with 7 Dicken 2015 . 8 Cf. Mosley 2003 www.fickleformulas.org epistemological pitfalls that IPE analyses confront. 9 We conclude this research note with three suggestions for data users: to buttress the robustness of our inferences, we need to familiarize ourselves more with specific measures used as proxies for broader concepts and better understand their limitations. Second, where alternative measurement approaches are available, we need to establish and explicitly argue which one best fits our hypotheses. And third, we need to conduct data sensitivity analyses to assess whether errors in specific BOP data series can be assumed to be randomly distributed, and think collectively about how to handle systematic biases in the data in cases in which they are not.
The measurement of economic life Stiglitz et al. 2010; Lepenies 2013; Fioramonti 2014; Philipsen 2015. 15 For example: the exclusion of unpaid labor from GDP, its ignorance of environmental destruction, or its inability to capture people's "happiness." 16 E.g. Lequiller and Blades 2014. 17 Biemer et al. 2014. 18 For an insightful analysis of the politics of data availability, see Hollyer et al. 2011 . 19 Goertz 2006 Herrera and Kapur 2007, 366. www. www.fickleformulas.org defects to be? To find out, we conducted an online survey among academic economists with a publication record in international economics. 26 Rather than aiming for full representativeness, our aim was simply to get a sense of the kinds and magnitude of problems that data users perceive, and whether they see these problems as decreasing or growing. Data users' sense of quality developments 27 We chose these two countries to evoke images of "typical" advanced/developing economies. We do not believe there are strong a priori reasons for respondents to adopt extreme views on the quality of statistics these countries produce. 
Accuracy
All cross-border flows measured in BOP statistics are in principle recorded twice: once by the sending economy and once by the receiving one. Asymmetries between these two quantities which in theory should be identical -can indicate measurement problems.
Errors in subcomponents can cancel each other out at the aggregate level and transactions missed by both sender and receiver do not show up on either side. Mirror analyses therefore underestimate "actual" measurement errors. But they do suggest a lower-bound estimate of such problems and their evolution over time.
www.fickleformulas.org 1981, 1990-1992, 1994-2007, 2011-2015 They may in fact be increasing. Second, we find marked differences between the various BOP subcomponents, belying users' sense that measurement errors are roughly similar across them (cf. Figure 2 ). They are much more sizable for FDI than for trade, and stunningly large for PFI flows-where the discrepancy was nearly as large as total reported inflows in 2008 and 2011.
We performed a similar exercise for bilateral merchandise trade statistics, which are more developed than other bilateral data sets. The IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics contain all monthly and annual data on bilateral merchandise trade flows reported by member countries since 1945. 29 We matched annual dyadic import and export records to calculate the reported trade flow from country A to B, first according to data from A, then from B. This allows us to calculate the mirror asymmetry between the two flows.
We dropped all dyad-years for which the IMF indicated the use of partner records to impute missing mirror values and ignored all dyadic observations in which one of the values is equal to zero to avoid an inflation of asymmetries (statistical offices sometimes substitute zero for missing values). This leaves us with 294,546 cases in which two countries have separately reported the same flow.
To report the results, we create two high-density scatterplots: one for all reporters (top of Figure 4 ) and, to discount the consequences of the addition of new reporters over time, www.fickleformulas.org www.fickleformulas.org The plots above show that discrepancies of such magnitude are not cherry-picked outliers; they are the rule rather than the exception. We find no indication that measurement errors are getting smaller over time. In the case of the USA the most prominent trade deficit country we might have expected political bias that would let it report higher deficits than its trading partners. But at least with the major US trading partners, this pattern does not hold. How can we explain the size of these measurement errors and their persistence?
The drivers of measurement inaccuracies The fact that the statistics appear unreliable to an extent and in a manner that cannot always be fully assessed may in itself be a conclusion of considerable importance to analysts who are obliged to work with them. (…) [T] he best data now available are sometimes conflicting or otherwise obviously deficient and thus require cautious handling. (…) The interpretation of developments may be substantially affected by the choice made between alternative data sources and by the assumptions made about the causes of observed discrepancies.
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To our mind, the admonition has lost nothing of its import. Yet as empirical researchers we too often disregard these problems, assuming that measurement errors are randomly distributed (leading, in the worst case, merely to attenuation bias). The review of the statistical literature has shown that this is a dangerous assumption.
Rather than being "random", measurement errors are too systematic to be ignored but 47 IMF 1992. 48 Ibid., 7. 49 IMF Archives 1966, 25. www.fickleformulas.org not systematic enough to allow straightforward statistical treatment. Rather than being assumed away, they deserve our serious attention. Social scientists mostly use BOP data to study the determinants or effects of crossborder flows of goods, services, or capital. It entails something crossing a border in some meaningful sense, and often also a corresponding change in the nationality of asset ownership say, bank deposits were "in" Germany and are now "in" Switzerland.
The concept-measurement gap
Normally, data usage also implies that flows originate in reported sending country A and are destined to reported receiving country B.
But these "something moves from A to B" dynamics are not necessarily what BOP data record. Rather than aiming to identify the "nationality" of asset ownership, it uses the criterion of legal residence. BPM5 still counted goods that enter a country only for processing before onward shipment as "conventional" imports. In BPM6, the IMF recommends ignoring the gross value of these flows and recording the processing fee in the trade in services accounts.
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If implemented, this approach would reveal a completely different image of world trade, with trading nations (in contrast to those producing for export) becoming much smaller players in the global economy.
In the case of merchanting transactions in which a resident entity re-sells a good acquired abroad in a third country, without the product ever physically entering the resident's economy BPM6 recommends recording the difference between the gross export and import values in the goods account rather than the merchant's profits as a service export as in BPM5. (That said, because merchant resident countries struggle to 52 Farrell and Newman 2014. 53 UNECE et al., chap. 5. www.fickleformulas.org detect flows that never physically enter the country, such activity often remains unrecorded).
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Taken together, the fragmentation of global production chains necessitates careful differentiation; whether one is interested in "gross" or "net" flows ultimately depends on the conceptual or theoretical question at hand. In any case, analysts need to assess whether the data suit their purposes, which may hinge on largely unheeded details such as whether a country follows BPM5 or BPM6. Sposi and Koech 2013. 56 A recent paper estimates the volume of services exports as a share of total exports having increased from less than ten percent in 1970 to close to twenty percent in 2014. Loungani et al. 2017 , 8. 57 WTO 2017 www.fickleformulas.org Services trade statistics also struggle to distinguish actual "cross-national"
transactions from MNE-internal accounting procedures. To minimize tax payments, multinational enterprises often create special purpose vehicles in low-tax jurisdictions where they "book" profits on intellectual property. 58 BOP statistics are based on an entity's formal legal residency rather than the nationality of its ultimate owners and hence do not adjust for the "re-routed" trade in services. In short, the de-nationalization of economic production and consumption and the growing complexity and opacity of corporate and financial structures have not only impaired progress towards the harmonization of statistical standards. Much more fundamentally, they have undermined the validity and hence usefulness of the statistical constructs themselves. Patterns of production, trade, and financial flows no longer conform to textbook images in which country A sends a domestically produced good to country B and in return receives a payment that can be traced to consumers in that country. As multinational enterprises, obscure special purpose entities, highly fragmented production chains, and complex patterns of debts and credits proliferate, national accounting templates that assume simple economic relationships capture current realities less and less well. Invariably, the problems defy easy solutions. The mismatch between a globalized economy and the statistics that depict it in inter-national terms is here to stay.
Commitment to international harmonization means that existing statistical standards are hard to amend. 80 Even when definitional and conceptual issues are less thorny, building new data sets requires heroic effort and a great deal of time. Statistical standards will thus always lag behind developments in the real economy. The more rapidly the economy changes, the larger the gap becomes.
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We do not seek to indict quantitative scholarship per se. Rather, we believe it is a sign of disciplinary maturity to look squarely at the limitations of our data and decide for what purposes and with what caveats we can plausibly use them.
Just as statisticians have no easy fixes for the problems we have outlined, there are no off-the-shelf solutions for the academic users of international economic data.
Nevertheless, we wish to conclude with three suggestions that together constitute an however imperfect data integrity check. First, to strengthen the robustness of our 79 Ibid. 80 The OECD's Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) data will be very welcome as an attempt to depict value-creation more accurately. It remains to be seen, however, whether it succeeds to put some of the hard conceptual conundrums to rest. 81 Research interview with WTO statistician, Geneva, 22 August 2017. www.fickleformulas.org results, researchers need to become familiar with the specific measurements used in our data sets as proxies for broader concepts. In particular, we need to acquaint ourselves with the measurement problems of data sets to determine whether these endanger our inferences. We also need to examine to what degree the reported data actually reflect what they say on the outside think for example of reported US outward PFI that resulted from foreign takeovers of American firms.
Second, where alternative measurement approaches are available, we should make clear which approach most closely fits our hypotheses. For some theories involving trade, gross trade may be the relevant concept; for others, re-exports are irrelevant and should ideally be excluded from the data. Whether a data set is appropriate for analysis depends not only on the concepts it covers, but on whether the specific measurement approach actually fits underlying intuitions.
Third, all macroeconomic indicators, independent of their conceptual fit, suffer from measurement errors which we cannot simply assume to be random. Factors that can systematically bias a country's BOP data include deliberate data manipulation, statistical capacity, the structure of the national economy (for example its level of development or the size of its digital sector), and its specific function in the global economic network (e.g. trading hub, financial center, tax haven, offshore center, and so on). As researchers, we inevitably have to deal with imperfect data on international economic trends. The most promising way forward, we argue, leads through careful reflection about potential biases in our data and robustness tests that evaluate how sensitive our findings are to the unescapable defects of economic statistics. 
